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CHAPTER ONE 
1. General Overview of the Study 
 
1.1 Introduction 
During an armed conflict in ʻSaphropʼ region, reports provided to party 
ʻVestroiaʼ indicate that a truck on territories under the control of the 
opposing party ʻKantomiaʼ is seen carrying munitions and a group of school 
children not engaged in hostilities.   
ʻVestroiaʼ is studying the legality of launching an attack on the truck under 
the rules of international humanitarian law (hereinafter IHL). 
 
By focusing on the legal obligations of the party deciding to launch the 
attack, this study is an attempt to examine the legal status under IHL of the 
children on the truck and other situations of attacks on targets involving 
children. The thesis will also explore other relevant rules of International 
Human rights law (hereinafter IHRL) and International Criminal Law 
(hereinafter ICL) and how they apply and interrelate with IHL rules 
regarding the protection of children in situations of attack.  The research 
aims to assess the effectiveness of the existing rules on the protection of 
children, rather than assessing to what extent they are respected. 
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The ultimate way to protect children from the effects of armed conflict would 
be to not engage in wars from the outset. This is unrealistic; therefore, there 
must be attempts to “better shield them from the worst”.1  
 
1.2 The Objective of the Study 
The purpose of the study is to examine the existing legal regime on the 
protection of children in armed conflict and assess its effectiveness. 
 
1.3 Relevance of the Study 
Whereas IHL is a body of law presumed to grant children special 
protection,2 children constitute about half of the civilian victims in armed 
conflicts.3  In the decade from 1986 to 1996, “an estimated two million 
children have been killed in armed conflicts” 4 and 6 million have been 
permanently disabled or seriously injured.5  In many conflicts, millions of 
children are “not merely bystanders, but targets.”6  “The deliberate targeting 
of civilians, especially children,[…] continues to intensify.”7 
 
                                                
1 Kuper, Jenny. International Law Concerning Child Civilians in Armed Conflict. (Oxford 1997). P. 244 
2 See ICRC Legal Fact Sheet (28-02-2003) “Legal Protection of Children in Armed Conflict”, 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/ang03_03_juridique_newlogo.pdf; and ICRC child protection adviser Kristin 
Barstad, http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/interview/children-interview-171109.htm. 
3 UNICEF - Children in Conflict and Emergencies. Available at http://www.unicef.org/protection/index_armedconflict.html.  
4 UN Doc.: A/51/306. 26 August 1996.  Impact of Armed Conflict on Children. (Machel Study)  Report of the expert of the 
Secretary- General Ms. Graca Machel.  P.5. http://www.unicef.org/graca/a51-306_en.pdf ; and supra fn.3. 
5 Ibid., p.5; and Children in Conflict and Emergencies, supra fn.3. 
6 Ibid., p.5. 
7 Machel Study 10-year Strategic review. Children and Conflict in a Changing World, p.4. 
http://www.unicef.org/tdad/machelreview.pdf. 
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While this situation is partly a result of the violations of IHL rules, this does 
not preclude the need to examine the efficiency of the current protection 
regime and its vulnerability to abuse.8   The armed conflict in Afghanistan 
highlights this need.  Statistics indicate that 151 children were killed in 2009 
by regular armed forces,9 whose combatants are required to respect the 
laws of armed conflict.  This case is one among other incidents which 
indicates the need to revise the adequacy of the existing standards.10 
 
1.4 Clarification of Terminology 
Unless otherwise indicated, the following terminology will be used:  
“Children” refers to persons under the age of eighteen who have not been 
recruited by a belligerent party or used in taking direct participation in 
hostilities (hereinafter DPH).11  These children are victims of war crimes 
                                                
8 Despite their significance, the implementation and enforcement deficiencies of IHL rules are not dealt with in this study. 
9 Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict Radhika Coomaraswamy, in a press 
conference on 1 March 2010. Available at http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2010/100301_Children.doc.htm 
[13.05.2011]  
10 Other incidents confirm this assertion; e.g.(1) The allegedly mistaken killing by NATO helicopters of nine Afghan boys 
aged 9 to 15 while collecting firewood on 2 March 2011. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/03/world/asia/03afghan.html?_r=1;  
(2) knowingly killing eleven children, ranging in age from 1-12 years old in their house in the Gaza Strip on 01 January 2009 
as a result of an attack directed against their father, one of Hamas leaders Nizar Rayan, amidst accusations of using children 
for shielding purposes (Gaza incident 2009).  Available at 
http://www.btselem.org/english/gaza_strip/20090104_killing_of_nizar_rian_and_13_family_member.asp.  
(3) The attack by an MNF-I helicopter against suspected insurgents in the village of Al-Nedawat, Dujala Province on 8 May 
2007, which killed and injured six children in their school. The school was calculated as part of the collateral damage.  In: 
Children and armed conflict Report of the Secretary-General. General Assembly Sixty-second session. 21 December 2007. 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/62/609&Lang=E. para57. 
11 For the purposes of this thesis, “taking direct participation in hostilities” refers to the definition incorporated in The ICRC 
Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law (ICRC 
Guidance), adopted by the Assembly on the International Committee of the Red Cross on 26 February 2009, as:  “acts of war 
which by their nature or purpose are likely to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the enemy armed forces.”,  
para1944. 
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and are subject to different rules of protection during the conduct of 
hostilities.12  
“Unqualified protection” means protection that does not allow for 
exceptions even in special circumstances.  Instances of unqualified 
protections in IHL include: the prohibitions on pillage,13 rape,14 the taking of 
hostages15 and the use of chemical weapons.16   
“Qualified protection” refers to protection, which is not absolute under all 
circumstances; it is conditional, or allows for exceptions in certain 
circumstances, e.g. the protection of civilians during the conduct of 
hostilities in the case of a civilian directly participating in hostilities.17 
“General protection” is provided to the entire civilian population including 
children during an armed conflict. 
“Special protection” is accorded specifically to children. 
                                                
12 Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and article 8(2)(e)(vii), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute). 17 July 
1998, entered into force on 1 July 2002. State parties:139.  State signatories:114. 
13 Articles 28 and 47, Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague Regulations). The Hague, 18 October 1907. Entered into force on 
26.01.1910. State parties: 35.  State signatories: 15. Article 33, GCIV;  Article 4(2)(g), Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (APII) of 8 
June 1977; and Article 8(2)(b)(xvi), Rome Statute. 
14 Article 14, Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva (GCIII), 12 August 1949.  Entry into 
force: 21.10.1950.  State parties: 194; article 27, Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War. Geneva (GCIV), 12 August 1949.  Entered into force: 21.10.1950.  States parties:194. 
15 Articles 34 and 147, GCIV; Article 75(2)(c); art 4(2)(c), APII and rule 96, Henckaerts, J-M. and Doswald-Beck, L. 
Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol I Rules (ICRC Study). (Cambridge 2005). 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/pcustom. 
16 Article 8(2)(b)(xviii), Rome Statute and  rule 74, ICRC Study. 
17 Article 51(3), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (API), 8 June 1977. Entry into force: 07.12.1978.  State parties: 170.  State 
signatories:170. Not all Members of the Geneva Conventions are members in API.  Nevertheless, many contend that several 
API and APII provisions are either declaratory or have crystallized customary rules and are thus binding even upon non-
parties. See, e.g., Oerter, Stefan. “Methods and Means of Combat.” In: (Dieter Fleck eds. 1998). Second edition. The 
Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts. (Pp. 119-235). Pp.122-123; Prosecutor v. Tadić, (Case no. IT-94-1-AR-
72), Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction 2 October 1995 ( Tadić Case), The 
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 ( ICTY), para 117; the ICRC Commentaries to the Geneva 
Conventions and Additional Protocols (Commentary) to API, p.628, para 1993. 
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“Situations of attack” are attacks on a target, whether a civilian object or 
a military objective, containing children or in the vicinity of children. 
“Attacks” in this sense “means acts of violence against the adversary, 
whether in offence or in defence.”18 
“Targets involving children” refer to the presence of children within or in 
the vicinity of a target. 
 
1.5  Scope and limitations 
• The age of children 
There is so far no shared understanding among States of the legal age 
when childhood ends. Variations exist when defining the age of majority:19 
voting age, military age, criminal responsibility, but in general, the age of 18 
“represents a continuing trend in the legal definition of “child.ʼ”20 
IHL treaties stipulate for different age-limits with respect to different 
protective measures for children, varying mostly between fifteen21 and 
eighteen.22  The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(hereinafter Rome Statute)23 provides that the conscription, enlistment or 
                                                
18 Article 49(1), API. 
19 Goodwin-Gill, Guy and Ilene Cohn. Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflicts. (Oxford 1994). Pp  6-9; 
and Kuper (1997) pp. 7-10. 
20 Pappas, Anna Mamalakis.  “Introduction.”  In: Law and Status of the Child. Vol.1. Pappas, A.M (New York 1983). Pp. 
xxvii-lv at p. xl: XL. Freeman  confirms that “most developed countries currently draw the line at 18’ between childhood and 
adulthood, but he emphasizes that this is arbitrary: Freeman, M.. The Limits of Children’s Rights.  In (Freeman and Veerman 
eds.). The Ideologies of Children’s Rights. (Dordrecht 1992).  (Pp. 29-46) at pp-34-35. 
21 E.g. under GCIV: Article 24 concerning measures to ensure non separation of orphans and children from their; Article 38 
requiring same preferential treatment for aliens as nationals; Article 50 on preferential measures with regard to food, medical 
care and protection adopted prior to occupation and Article 89 on additional food for interned children.  On the minimum age 
for participation in hostilities and recruitment see Article 77, API and article 4, APII.  
22 E.g. Article 68, GCIV regarding compulsion to work in occupied territory; article 77, API regarding execution of death 
penalty and article 6, APII on pronouncing death penalty. 
23 Supra fn.12. 
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engaging in hostilities of children under the age of 15 is a war crime both in 
IAC24 and NIAC.25 
Under the Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereinafter CRC), any 
human being under the age of 18 is a child.26  In restraining the 
participation of children in armed conflicts, it changes the age limit to 15.27  
The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict (hereinafter Optional Protocol to 
CRC)28 raises the minimum age for direct participation in hostilities to 1829 
and prohibits compulsory recruitment of anyone under 18 by government 
forces.30  The Protocol calls on State Parties to raise the minimum age 
above 15 for voluntary recruitment.31   In the case of non-state armed 
groups, the treaty prohibits both voluntary and compulsory recruitment of 
persons under 18.32 
Taking into consideration the almost universal ratification of the CRC,33 
reflecting the prevailing view among States, a child -for the purpose of this 
study- is every human being below 18 years.34  
                                                
24 Article 8(2)(b) (xxvi), Rome Statute on situations of International Armed Conflict (IAC).  
25 Article 8(2)(e) (vii), Rome Statute; on situations of Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC).  
26 Article 1, Convention on the Rights of the Child ( CRC). Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by 
General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989. Entered into force 2 September 1990. State Signatories: 140.  
State Parties: 193. 
27 Ibid., article 38; also see Kuper (1997), supra fn.1, pp. 102-103: the author indicates that  the minimum age limit of 15 
years for ensuring non direct participation in hostilities in art. 38(2), CRC is due to the lack of consensus in the drafting 
group between two views: raising the standard to the age of 18 or keeping inline with articles 77(3) of API and article 
4(3)(c), APII.   
28 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (: 
Optional Protocol to CRC). Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 
A/RES/54/263 of 25 May 2000. Entry into force 12 February 2002. State Signatories: 128. State Parties: 141. 
29 Article 1. 
30 Article 2. 
31 Article 3. 
32 Article 4. 
33 193 State parties.  The USA and Somalia are the only UN member States who have not ratified the CRC. 
34 Article 1, CRC. 
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The following issues are excluded from the scope of this thesis:  
• Regardless of the conviction that children need to be 
protected in all situations, legal issues relating to children directly 
participating in hostilities35 and children recruited in armed forces or 
groups will not be covered by this study. Extensive studies related 
specifically to the topic were already conducted.36  
 
• The distinction between international and non-international 
armed conflicts with regards to the analysis of protection of children 
in situations of attacks in IHL.  
Internal conflicts were for long perceived as an exclusive internal 
matter subject to the sovereignty of the state rather than subject to 
international regulation.37  However, there is an increasing trend in 
international law to disregard the distinction between the IHL rules 
pertaining to IACs and NIACs.  Some commentators view that this 
distinction “frustrates the humanitarian purpose of the law of war in 
most of the instances in which war now occurs”.38  Others perceive it 
                                                
35 See supra fn.11. 
36 E.g. Goodwin-Gill, Guy and Ilene Cohn (1994), supra fn.19; and Machel Study, supra fn.4. 
37 Stewart, James G. Towards a single definition of armed conflict in international humanitarian law: A critique of 
internationalized armed conflict. In: International Review of the Red Cross No. 850  (June 2003) (Pp. 313-350) at pp. 316-
317. Available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_850_stewart.pdf. [10.05.2011] 
38 Reisman, W. Michael and Silk, J. Which law applies to the Afghan conflict?  In: American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 82. (1988). (Pp. 459-486) at p. 465: “The ‘distinction’ between international wars and internal conflicts is no longer 
factually tenable or compatible with the thrust of humanitarian law, as the contemporary law of armed conflict has come to 
be known. One of the consequences of the nuclear stalemate is that most international conflict now takes the guise of internal 
conflict, much of it conducted covertly or at a level of low intensity. Paying lip service to the alleged distinction simply 
frustrates the humanitarian purpose of the law of war in most of the instances in which war now occurs.”  
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as “arbitrary”,39 while many consider it “undesirable”40 and “difficult to 
justify.”41  
The said dichotomy is losing its value with regards to the protection 
of civilians,42 which is the subject of this thesis.  This is without 
prejudice to certain important differences with respects to the legal 
status of persons taking direct part in hostilities.   
 
It may nevertheless be mentioned that, the merging between IAC 
and NIAC of the IHL rules relating to the conduct of hostilities is 
somewhat more complex and affects the interplay between IHL and 
IHRL rules.   
Although a situation may amount to a NIAC, the civilian population is 
frequently covered by the IHRL regime;43 IHRL obligations on the 
State towards its citizens are to be respected, save on legally 
permissible derogation grounds.  IHRL provides a higher level of 
protection than IHL for the persons under the territorial Stateʼs 
control.  Whereas, in IAC situations, a belligerent party is primarily 
bound by IHL rules vis-à-vis the enemy civilians when they are in its 
                                                
39 See Dupuy, Rene Jean and Leonetti, Antoine. “La notion de conflict armé à caractère non international.”  In: (A. Cassese 
ed.) The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict. Editoriale scientifica. (Naples 1979). (PP. 258-276). P. 258: “Elle 
produit une dichotomie arbitraire entre les conflits, puisque la distinction, purement formelle, ne se fonde pas sur une 
observation objective de la réalité [...]”. 
40 Detter, I. The Law of War. London 2002. P. 49: “It is difficult to lay down legitimate criteria to distinguish international 
wars and internal wars and it must be undesirable to have discriminatory regulations of the Law of War for the two types of 
conflict.”  
41 Warbrick, C. and Rowe, P. The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia: The decision of the Appeals Chamber on 
the interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction in the Tadic ́ case. In: International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 45. (1996). 
(Pp. 691-701) at p. 698. 
42 Tadić Case, ICTY supra fn.17, paras 96-97. 
43 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory ( the Wall Advisory Opinion), 
Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, International Court of Justice ( ICJ) Rep. 2004, paras 102–114; the Case Concerning 
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo Case), Judgment, 19 December 2005, ICJ Rep. 2005, para 216; and 
Loizidou v. Turkey, Preliminary Objections, (Series A no. 310), European Court of Human Rights ( ECtHR), Judgment of 23 
March 1995, paras 63–64. 
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hands. The application and interplay of IHL and IHRL rules is then 
different in these two situations.  
While the IAC / NIAC dichotomy introduces another level of analysis, 
the issue will not be subject to particular focus in the course of this 
study, since its scope does not allow to go into the details of this 
complex issue. The focus shall rather be on the protection of the 
child as such, who should not be caught in the complex relationship 
between the belligerent parties and ought to be protected as such. 
 
• The focus in this study will rather be on the responsibilities of 
the attacking party rather than the legal obligations of the defender 
party to the conflict. 
 
1.6  Methodology and sources 
The study will examine lex lata on the protection of children in armed 
conflicts under the different legal paradigms and apply the relevant rules to 
cases of attacks on targets involving children.  
The relevant treaty and customary rules, judicial decisions and legal 
scholarly writings are used in the course of the research. 
The legal sources shall be dealt with in accordance with article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the relevant 
provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), namely 
article 31.44  
 
                                                
44 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), adopted on 22 May 1969; entered into force on 27 January 1980; it 
was ratified by 111 States as of November 2010; those that have not ratified it yet may still recognize it as binding upon them 
in as much as it is a restatement of customary law. 
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1.7  Structure 
Chapter two will start by exploring the existing IHL rules on general 
protection of civilians and special protections granted particularly to children 
during armed conflicts.   
 
In light of the IHL regime, the third chapter will assess the legality of 
launching attacks on targets involving children by applying the existing rules 
on the truck scenario and other situations of attack.  
 
Chapter four will examine parallel legal paradigms, other than IHL, 
applicable to children during armed conflicts.  The focus will be on the 
human rights of children during the conduct of hostilities, namely the right to 
life, in an attempt to seek additional guidelines and legal norms discerning 
the lack of clarity in the existing IHL rules with regards to attacks on targets 
involving children. Throughout the examination of the IHL, IHRL and ICL lex 
lata, the research will focus on the treatment of children as a distinct group. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
2. Lex Lata on the protection of children in International Humanitarian 
Law 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Children, as part of the civilian population enjoy a host of protections under 
IHL.   The main relevant treaty provisions are found in the 1949 Convention 
(IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GCIV),45 
the Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GCIII),46 
the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(API)47 and to a lesser extent in Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts (APII).48  Other treaties governing the 
use of weapons in armed conflicts also provide for such protections to an 
extent.49  Furthermore, customary international law contains a wide range 
of protections for the civilian population and children in particular. 
                                                
45 Supra fn.14. 
46 Supra fn. 14. 
47 Supra fn. 17. 
48 Supra fn. 13. 
49 E.g. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II to CCW). 
Geneva, 10 October 1980. Entry into force: 02.12.1983. State parties: 94. State Signatories: 1; and Convention on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively 
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Some IHL rules deal exclusively with the protection of children, treating 
them as a distinct group, where they enjoy ʻspecial protectionʼ.  Some of 
these protections are extended to them through their mothers, i.e. 
expectant mothers and mothers of children under seven.  Other protections 
concern children under 15.50 
 
The present chapter will explore general and special relevant rules 
pertaining to children caught in situations of armed conflict. 
 
2.2 Special protection for children as a distinct group in IHL 
2.2.1 Treaty law 
The following section will explore the relevant IHL instruments granting 
children special protection.  The discussion is to a certain extent instrument 
based in order to highlight the weight and relevance each treaty accords to 
child protection. 
 
Firstly, GCIV, which relates to the protection of civilians in international 
armed conflicts and military occupation. The convention provides for 
different categories of protection to children during armed conflict according 
to their age and the nature of their presence in the conflict area.  
General protections are granted to populations against certain 
consequences of war.  This category includes expectant mothers who enjoy 
particular protection and respect.51  
                                                                                                                                  
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. Geneva, 10 October 1980. (CCW). Entered into force on 02.12.1983. State 
parties:114. State Signatories: 5. 
 
51 Article 16, GCIV. 
 20 
 
Other protections are concerned with children under the age of seven and 
children under fifteen; e.g. measures to ensure their welfare52, the 
permission of free passage of food and medical supplies53 and the non-
separation from their families.54  In the event of such separation, measures 
must be taken to ensure that they are not left to their own resources and 
that their education and exercise of religion are facilitated in all 
circumstances.55 
 
As aliens in the territory of a party to the conflict, children under the age of 
15 years old, pregnant women and mothers of children under seven years 
must benefit from any preferential treatment to the same extent as the 
nationals of the State concerned.56    
 
In occupied territories, the occupying power may not compel civilian 
children to work,57 nor can it enforce death penalty on them.58  The power in 
control also has general obligations to facilitate the childʼs education and 
care59 in addition to ensuring the free passage of all consignments of 
essential foodstuffs and clothing for children under the age of fifteen.60  Age 
considerations are to be taken in account in the case of the detainment of 
minors.61  Special protection exists for children through the non-separation 
                                                
52 Ibid., article 24. 
53 Ibid., article 23. 
54 Ibid., articles 25 and 26. 
55 Ibid., article 24. 
56 Ibid., article 38. 
57 Ibid., article 51. 
58 Ibid., article 68. 
59 Ibid., article 50. 
60 Ibid., article 23. 
61 Ibid., article 76. 
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of families during their deportations, transfers, and evacuations.62   GCIV 
also provides for the respect of childrenʼs rights to education63 and ensures 
their provision of health care64 in the different situations while caught in 
armed conflicts.   
 
It has been argued that the “Fourth Geneva Convention does not state as a 
principle that special protection should be given to children”.65  However, a 
range of its provisions do stipulate for preferential treatment to be granted 
to them. 
 
Secondly, turning to GCIII, which concerns the treatment of prisoners of 
war, children are also covered by the treaty.  When children are in the 
custody of an enemy party, age considerations are to be taken into account 
when utilizing Prisoners of War (POW) for labour.66  The treaty allows for 
preferential treatment of children POW as an exception to the rule on equal 
treatment.  This exception is based on age considerations, among other 
criteria.67  
 
However, GCIII does not seem to impose any type of preferential treatment 
on the detaining authority vis-à-vis children, whereas GCIV and API include 
                                                
62 Ibid., article 49;  more general obligations in this concern, see ibid., article 17 on removal of children from beseiged or 
encercled areas; article 74, API on reunion of dispersed families and article 78, API on the evacuation of children. 
63 Ibid., article 24,  On children’s education, see also article 50, GCIV (in occupied territories) and 94 (on children’s 
education and welfare in internment places). 
64 Ibid., article 14, On protections for maternity cases, see articles 18, 21 and 23, GCIV.  See also Article 91, GCIV in case 
of internment. 
65 Plattner, Denise. Protection of Children in International Humanitarian Law. International Review of the Red Cross, No. 
240 (30-06-1984). Available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jmat.htm 
66 Article 49, GCIII. 
67 Ibid., article 16 states that POW should be treated equally “without any adverse distinction based on race, nationality, 
religious belief or political opinions, or any other distinction founded on similar criteria”. However, it takes into 
consideration “the provisions of GCIII relating to rank and sex of POW, and subject to any privileged treatment which may 
be accorded to them by reason of their state of health, age or professional qualifications.” 
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a host of rules regulating the conditions of children placed in internment or 
their presence in internment places (i.e. dependent on internees), as the 
case may be, in order to ensure their safety and well being.68  
 
Thirdly, API, which deals with international armed conflicts,69 provides for a 
wide range of ʻindirectʼ protectionʼ by asserting that "wounded" and "sick" 
also cover expectant mothers, maternity cases and new-born babies.70  In 
addition, API dedicates two articles to the protection of children specifically. 
Article 77 provides that ʻspecial respectʼ should be given to them71 and that 
they must be protected against any form of indecent assault.  More 
importantly, it imposes on belligerent parties the obligation to refrain from 
recruiting children below the age of 15 years.  If this is not the case, such 
children continue to benefit from the special protection accorded by the 
provision, whether or not they are prisoners of war.  In cases where they 
are arrested, detained or interned for reasons related to the armed conflict, 
they are to be protected under certain circumstances.72   Itʼs worth 
underlining the unrestricted scope of application of this Article, since it 
applies to ʻall childrenʼ in the conflict area, whether affected or not by the 
conflict.73  Article 78 safeguards the rights of children in cases of evacuation 
under compelling reasons related to their health or safety with a view to 
facilitating their return to their families and country.  It also provides for a 
right to education. 
                                                
68 See articles 81, 82, 85, 89, 91, 94, 119, 127 and 132, GVIV; articles  77(3) and (4), API. 
69 Article 1(4), API. 
70 Article  8.  See also Ibid., article  76 which provides for the protection of pregnant women and mothers having dependent 
infants in case of detainment and against the execution of death penalty.  
71 Ibid., article 77(1): “children shall be the object of special respect.” 
72 Article 77(4) provides that children must be held in quarters separate from the quarters of adults, except where families 
are accommodated as family units. 
73 Commentary to article 77, API states: “This article is not subject to any restrictions as regards its scope of application; it 
therefore applies to all children who are in the territory of States at war, whether or not they are affected by the conflict”.  
Para 3177. 
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The execution of the death penalty on persons below 18 years when the 
offence (which must be related to the armed conflict) was committed, is 
prohibited.74  
 
Besides the preferential treatment accorded to children under API, the 
convention establishes the principle of special protection to children and 
addresses the issue of their direct participation in hostilities. 
 
Fourthly, APII, which deals with non-international armed conflicts,75 seems 
to provide a higher level of protection as regards the death penalty in the 
case of children.  Article 6(4) goes beyond the prohibition of the execution 
of the said punishment; it prohibits even pronouncing death penalty on 
children.76   
On the other hand, APII reiterates certain special protections granted to 
children in armed conflicts.  It protects their rights to education,77 non-
separation from their families,78 in evacuation conditions,79 besides the 
obligation not to recruit those under15 years old and not allowing them to 
directly participate in hostilities.80   The aforementioned special protection 
continues to apply even in the event of their direct participation in 
hostilities.81  
 
                                                
74 Article  77(5), API.  
75 Article 1, APII. 
76 Combatants under 18 in IAC are eligible for POW status whenever they are in the custody of an enemy party, thus 
protected by GCIII.  However, persons below the age of 18 engaging in hostilities during NIAC are not eligible to POW 
status in their own State, thus not protected by GCIII.  They are subject to the national legal system.  The higher standard set 
in APII in this regard is a reflection of the greater influence of IHRL during NIAC.  
77 Article 4(3)(a), APII. 
78 Ibid., article 4(3)(b). 
79 Ibid., article 4(3)(e). 
80 Ibid., article 4(3)(c). 
81 Ibid., article 4(3)(d). 
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APII is largely a replica of the core human rights obligations by the State 
towards its citizens. 
 
Finally, turning to international legal instruments regulating the means of 
warfare, while conventions related to use of certain weapons in warfare are 
concerned with the protection of civilians in general, the 1980 Protocol on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other 
Devices (Protocol II to the CCW)82 specifically prohibits the use of booby-
traps associated with "children's toys or other portable objects or products 
specially designed for the feeding, health, hygiene, clothing or education of 
children".83 
 
The evolution from the 1949 Geneva Conventions to the 1977 API and the 
1980 Protocol II to CCW (partly illustrated by the prohibitions on engaging 
children in hostilities,84 the incorporation of provisions exclusively dealing 
with children85 and the absence of age limits regarding preferential 
treatment)86 reflects the increased awareness of the need to address 
childrenʼs needs as a distinct group under IHL. 
 
Nevertheless, while international treaties recognize and address a number 
of the special needs of children caught in areas of armed conflict, these 
instruments do not touch upon particular protections to be accorded to them 
in situations of attack. 
 
                                                
82 Supra fn. 49. 
83 Article 6(1)(b)(v) of Protocol II to CCW. 
84 Article  77, API 
85 Ibid. and Article 6(1)(b)(v) of Protocol II  to CCW. 
86 The only exception in setting an age limit is in article  77, API comes with regards to the prohibitions on engaging 
children in hostilities and recruiting them in the armed forces. 
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2.2.2 Customary international law 
While IHL treaty law distinguishes between situations arising in IAC and 
NIAC, customary international humanitarian law extends the protections 
granted to civilians to cover both types of conflicts to a certain extent mostly 
concerning the rules of protection. 
  
Observers hold the view that the Geneva Conventions are declaratory of 
customary international law,87 while the ICJ maintains that this is true in 
some respects, since they reflect the ʻfundamental general principles of 
humanitarian lawʼ.88  In addition, provisions of API related to the protection 
of the human person are perceived as customary rules.89  Hence, rules 
reflected in these conventions shall not be reexamined in the present 
section.  
 
Besides the protections granted to civilians in general, customary 
international humanitarian law provides for specific rules concerning 
children.  
Customary international humanitarian law includes provisions which entitle 
children in armed conflicts to special respect and protection in both NIAC 
and IAC situations.90  Children must neither be recruited into armed forces 
or armed groups,91 nor allowed to take part in hostilities.92  Furthermore, 
customary rules regulate childrenʼs internment conditions with regards to 
                                                
87 Meron, Theodor. Human rights and humanitarian norms as customary law. (Oxford 1989). P 8. 
88 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.), Merits, 1986. ICJ REP. 14, Judgment 
of June 27, para 218. 
89 Commentary to API, P.628, para 1993. 
90 Rule 135, ICRC study. 
91 Ibid., rule 136. 
92 Ibid., rule 137. 
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their separation from adults except their families.93  In case of 
displacement, all possible measures must be taken to ensure satisfactory 
conditions of childrenʼs shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition and 
non-separation of family members.94  
 
Although wide-ranging and treats children as a distinct group, the ʻspecial 
protectionsʼ regime under existing IHL does not cover any special 
protection for children in situations of attacks.  
 
2.3 General qualified protection of children from attacks as part of the 
civilian population in IHL  
The following section will explore treaty and customary rules on the 
protection children, as part of the civilian population, when caught in areas 
of armed conflicts.   
 
2.3.1 The principle of distinction 
This “cardinal principle”95 is one of the “intransgressible” rules of customary 
international humanitarian law96 and is based on the distinction between 
individual civilians, the civilian population and combatants97 and between 
civilian objects and military objectives.98  It is already implicitly mentioned in 
the Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive 
                                                
93 Ibid., rule 120. 
94 Ibid., rule 131. 
95 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996.  (Nuclear Weapons Advisory 
Opinion) ICJ Reports 1996. para. 78. 
96 Ibid., para 179. 
97 Article  48 and 51(2), API; Rule 1, ICRC study.  
98 Article  48 and 52(2), API ; Rule 7, ICRC study.  
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Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight (St. Petersburg Declaration), which 
states that “the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to 
accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy”.99  
Although the principle was not explicitly mentioned in the 1907 Convention 
(IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex 
(Hague Regulations),100 article 25 prohibits “the attack or bombardment, by 
whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are 
undefended”.  
During IAC, civilians comprise of all persons who are not combatants;101 
and combatants must distinguish themselves from the civilian population.102 
In NIAC, there is no legal definition of the status groups.  However the 
distinction principle still applies.  Consequently, attacks against the civilian 
population as such are prohibited.103  The same applies to attacks against 
individual civilians as long as they do not directly participate in hostilities.104  
Deliberate attacks on them are unlawful, even if they confer a military 
advantage.105 
 
The willful violation of the principle of distinction is a grave breach under 
API106 and constitutes a war crime both in situations of IAC107 and NIAC.108  
 
                                                
99 Preamble, Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight. Saint 
Petersburg, 29 November 1868. (St. Petersburg Declaration), entered into force on 11.12.1868. 
100 Supra fn. 13. 
101 Article  50 read with Article 43, API; article  4(1),(2),(3)and (6), GCIII and rule 5, ICRC study. 
102 Article  44(3), API. 
103 article  13(2), APII  and rule 1 ICRC study. 
104 Article 51(3), API; article 13(3), APII and rule 6, ICRC study.  
105 Gasser, Hans-Peter. “Negotiating the Protocols: Was It a Waste of Time?” In: (Astrid Dellissen et al. eds.) Humanitarian 
Law of Armed Conflict: Challenges Ahead. (London,1991). (Pp. 81-92) at p.82. 
106 Article  85(3)(a), API. 
107 Article  8(2)(b)(i), Rome Statute. 
108 Ibid., article  8(2)(e)(i). 
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Furthermore, according to the principle of distinction, it is prohibited to 
launch attacks against civilian objects.109  Only military objectives110 can be 
lawfully targeted.111  This protection, therefore ceases in cases where, and 
for such time as civilians are used for military purposes.112  In case of doubt 
about the nature of an object, a careful assessment given the specific 
conditions of the situation is required “as to whether there are sufficient 
indications to warrant an attack.”113  A presumption of the civilian character 
of an object is provided for in case of uncertainty.114  Moreover, it is 
prohibited to launch attacks which treat as a single military objective several 
clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in concentrations 
of civilians or civilian objects.115  
The duty to verify by all feasible means that a target is in fact a military 
objective116 is based on the rule of precautions in attacks, which aims at 
sparing civilians,117 through making the principle of distinction operational. 
 
The principle of distinction is reflected in other rules of IHL concerning 
prohibitions on indiscriminate attacks.   The use of weapons, which by their 
nature are indiscriminate, is prohibited.118  The same applies to attacks, 
which are not directed119 or cannot be directed120 against a specific military 
                                                
109 Article 52 (1), API; article  2(1), Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol 
III) (Protocol III to the CCW). Geneva, 10 October 1980. Entered into force in: 02.12.1983.  State Parties: 10; article  3(7), 
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on 3 May 1996 
(Amended Protocol II to the CCW), entered into force in 03.12.1998. Sate Parties: 97; and rule 7, ICRC study. 
110 Article  52(2), API; and rule 8 ICRC study. 
111 Articles  48 and 52(2), API  and rule 7, ICRC study. 
112 Article  52, API; and rule 10, ICRC study. 
113 ICRC study. P. 36. 
114 Article  52(3), API ; article  3(8)(a), Amended Protocol II to the CCW and rule 10, ICRC study. 
115 Article  51(5)(a), API and rule 13, ICRC study. 
116 Article 57(2)(a), API and rule 16, ICRC study.  
117 Rule 15, ICRC study. 
118 See article  3(3), Protocol II to the CCW; article  3(8), Amended Protocol II to the CCW  and rule 71, ICRC study. 
119 Article 51(4)(a), API and rule 12(a), ICRC study.  
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objective. Civilians are also protected against the effects of methods and 
means combat, which cannot be limited under IHL.121 
 
The principle of distinction is also codified in treaties related to the means of 
warfare, for instance Protocol II to CCW,122 its 1996 Amended Protocol II,123 
its Protocol III124 and in the preamble of the 1977 Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction.125 
 
The principle of distinction constitutes the basic foundation for childrenʼs 
protection, as part of the civilian population, against direct targeting and 
against attacks. Under the same principle, the protection accorded to 
civilian objects (where children usually are present; i.e. schools, homes and 
hospitals etc…) confers protection on children.  However, there is no 
special obligation on the attacker party to take particular care to avoid 
launching an attack on a target involving children; they are treated in the 
same line as other civilians. 
 
2.3.2 The Rule on Proportionality in Attack and Precautionary 
Measures 
The principle of proportionality exists in several forms under international 
law. As a general principle of international law, proportionality is a means of 
                                                                                                                                  
120 Article  51(4)(b), API and rule 12(b), ICRC study. 
121 Article  51(4)(c), API and rule 12(c), ICRC study.  
122 Article  3(2), Protocol II to CCW. 
123 Article  3(7), Amended Protocol II to the CCW, supra fn.109. 
124 Article  2(1), Protocol III to CCW, fn. 112. 
125 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their 
Destruction, 18 September 1997. Entered into force on 1.3.1999. State Parties: 156.  State Signatories: 2. 
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coordination between conflicting legal positions, aiming at achieving a fair 
balance between means and ends.  In IHRL, proportionality serves as a 
criterion to balance the Stateʼs versus the individualʼs interests. 
  
Turning to IHL, proportionality has different areas of application and 
different shapes.126 In jus ad bellum,127 it aims at regulating the resort to 
use of force by States by identifying the permissible grounds for such 
resort128 and determining the intensity and magnitude of military action.129   
In jus in bello,130 proportionality governs primarily the targeting process.  
This is referred to as the “rule of proportionality”, which serves to mitigate 
the absolute nature of the rule of distinction.  The rule of proportionality also 
governs belligerent reprisals,131 which are “measures taken in the context of 
an existing armed conflict by one of the parties in response to unlawful 
conduct by an adversary”.132  These measures must be “proportionate to 
the violation against which they react.”133  This proportionality concept is 
similar to the general rule of proportionality in international law. 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, the discussion will be limited to the rule of 
proportionality in the context of targeting, i.e. that the expected collateral 
                                                
126 See Henderson Ian. Contemporary Law of Targeting: Military objectives, Proportionailty and Precautions in Attack 
under Additional Protocol I. (Leiden 2009). Pp. 180-183.  And Meron, Theodor. The Humanization of International Law. 
(Leiden 2006). P. 61-62. 
127 “Jus ad bellum” refers to the body of law concerning acceptable justifications to engage in war. 
128 For more information on proportionality in Jus ad Bellum, see: Hensel, Howard M.. The Law of Armed Conflict – 
Constraints on the Contemporary Use of Military Force.  (Aldershot 2005). 
129 Cannizzaro, Enzo.  Contextualizing Proportionality: jus ad bellum and jus in bello in the Lebanese war. In: International 
Review of the Red Cross. Volume 88 Number 864. (December 2006). (Pp. 779-792) at p. 781. 
130 “Jus in bello” refers to the body of law concerning the limits to acceptable wartime conduct. 
131 for further discussion of belligerent reprisals, see section 3.3. 
132 Greenwood, Christopher. “Reprisals and Reciprocity in the New Law of Armed Conflict.”  In: (Michael Meyer eds.): 
Armed Conflict and the New Law: Aspects of the 1977 Geneva Protocols and the 1981 Weapons Convention. (London 
1989). (Pp. 227-250) at p. 227. 
133 Cassese, Antonio. International Law. 2nd edition. (Oxford 2005), p.426. 
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damage of an attack on a military objective should not be excessive to the 
anticipated military advantage.134  In the event that the expected damage to 
civilian persons or objects would be excessive in relation to the anticipated 
military advantage, the attack would be indiscriminate and therefore 
prohibited.135 Some experts even consider causing expected 
disproportionate civilian casualties, loss or damage as ʻequivalent to a 
direct attackʼ, since the results are tantamount to those of deliberate 
attacks.136 
 
Therefore, the expected loss of civilian life and objects is not unlawful in IHL 
as long as it is proportional to the military advantage anticipated.  
Proportionality "is clearly not calculated according to the archaic lex talionis 
principle” especially when it involves human lives.137  The resolution of the 
proportionality equation requires a determination of the relative value of the 
military advantage anticipated by one side and the expected civilian 
casualties or damage to civilian objectives of the opponent on the other 
side.138  
 
It follows that precautionary measures aim at minimizing the collateral 
damage.  
Before launching attacks on military objectives, belligerent parties must 
make the proportionality analysis. In cases where it is apparent that such 
                                                
134 Article  51(5)(b) and 57, API,  Rule 18, ICRC study.  
135 Article  51(5)(b), API and rule 14, ICRC study.  
136 Fenrick, William J. Attacking the Enemy Civilian as a Punishable Offense. In: 7 Duke Journal of Comparative and 
International Law (1997). (Pp.539-567) at p. 561. 
137 Sloane, Robert D. The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the 
Contemporary Law of War.  In: The Yale Journal of International Law; [Vol. 34: 47]. (2009). (Pp. 48–112) at p.99.  
Available at http://www.yale.edu/yjil/files_PDFs/vol34/Sloane.pdf 
138 Fenrick (1997), fn.136, p. 501.  For further discussion of the susceptibility of non-combatants to aerial bombardment, 
see: Oppenheim, L. International Law: A Treatise. In: Lauterpacht, H. LL.D eds., 7th edition. London 1952. Pp. 520-28. 
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an attack is disproportionate, the military commander is under the obligation 
to refrain from launching the attack,139 and it must be cancelled or 
suspended.140  This rule concerns those who plan an attack, the relevant 
decision makers and primarily those who execute it.141 In situations where 
visibility is unclear, greater caution is required.142 
In addition, all feasible precautions must be taken with regards to the 
choice of means and methods of warfare.143  Whenever there is a choice 
among several military objectives aiming at gaining similar military 
advantage, there is an obligation to opt for the attack causing least danger 
to civilian lives and objects.144  
 
Children, as part of the civilian population enjoy a range of protections 
against disproportionate attacks.145  However, no explicit provision provides 
particular protection to children, nor there is any explicit duty on a party to 
the conflict to take particular care when the civilians involved are children.  
 
 
2.3.3 Protection to involuntary human shields 
Children might be placed in the vicinity of a military objective, munitions 
could be hidden in places where they are present or persons engaging in 
military activities could mingle among them.  This is done with a view to 
benefit from the non-combatant immunity enjoyed by civilians in order to 
                                                
139 Article  57(2)(a)(iii), API. 
140 Article  57(2)(b), API and rule 19, ICRC study.  
141 Commentary on Article 57(2)(b), API .para 2220. 
142 Ibid., para 2221. 
143 Article  57(2)(a)(ii), API and rule 17, ICRC study.  
144 Article  57(3), API and rule 21, ICRC study.  
145 art. 57, API. 
 33 
shield potential military objectives liable to attack.  Children are thus being 
used as human shields. 
 
The obligations of the defender party relating to removing civilians from the 
vicinity of military objectives146 and the prohibitions against using civilians 
as human shields are well established and clear under IHL.147  This section 
will focus on the obligations of the attacking party vis-à-vis human shields. 
 
IHL draws a distinction between the legal status of involuntary and 
voluntary human shields.  Consequently, the question arises as to which 
category children used for shielding purposes belong?  The answer will 
determine the protection bestowed on children used as human shields.   
 
In reality, children -used as human shields- are mainly faced with two 
situations: 
a) Children accompanied by adults; e.g. parents.  During the 
conduct of hostilities, adults often do not even realize that 
combatants are situated in the vicinity or, alternatively, do not have 
control over them, i.e. cannot force those combatants to leave the 
area, where they are present.  On the other hand, and only in cases 
where there is enough time and space to react, attempting to run 
away with the children might increase the risk of being caught in the 
crossfire of either of the conflicting parties.  The least ill option is 
usually to hide, or freeze wherever they are, until the end of a strike 
or combat round.  It is worth mentioning that in many conflict areas, 
underground shelters are not available and that the accompanying 
civilian adults are not able to practically protect the children. 
                                                
146 Ibid., article 58. 
147 See article 51(7), API; rule 97, ICRC study: “The use of human shields is prohibited”. 
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b) Children unaccompanied by adults. In this case, children are 
not necessarily able to comprehend the situation they are in: either 
that they are in the vicinity of military objectives or that they are 
being used as human shields.  In addition, if they realize that they 
are in danger, they are presumed not to have the ability to 
adequately react to the danger they are facing.  
 
It is frequently argued that childrenʼs lack of legal capacity negates the 
voluntary nature of their participation in shielding a military objective.148  
Consensual or voluntary shielding cannot be raised on account of their lack 
of knowledge of IHL rules, awareness and clear understanding of the 
circumstances around them and their inability to take appropriate decisions 
and act upon them in war situations.149   
 
Hence, children may be considered as involuntary human shields, when 
used for shielding military objectives by a party to the conflict.150  
 
Turning to the legal status of children used as involuntary human shields, 
the commentary on API clearly asserts that even if the placing of civilians 
within or in the vicinity of military objectives is intentional, the attacker 
remains under the obligation to take the precautionary measures provided 
for in Article 57.151 
                                                
148 See Schmitt, Michael. Targeting and Humanitarian Law: Current Issues. In: 34 Israel Yearbook in Human Rights (2004). 
(Pp.59-104) at p. 96. 
149 See Preamble, Resolution 14, adopted by the Council of Delegates of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement in its Budapest session in November 1991, recognized that “persons under the age of eighteen years may not be 
sufficiently mature to understand the consequences of their actions, and to comply with international humanitarian law”. 
Available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/RC_Jan-Feb-1992.pdf . [15.05.2011].  
150 The scope of this study excludes children DPH as indicated in section 1.4. 
151 Commentary to API. P. 628. Para 1990. 
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On the other hand, article 147 of GCIV provides that the willful killing of 
protected persons constitutes a grave breach of the Convention.  It is 
asserted that using involuntary human shields is often equated with the 
taking of hostages,152 the execution of whom constitutes willful killing within 
the meaning of article 147 of GCIV.153 However, it is uncertain whether 
such an execution is deemed as willful killing depends primarily on the 
identity of the perpetrator, i.e. only when the execution is committed by the 
hostage taker not by another party, in this case a member belonging to the 
defender party (and not the attacker party).  
Nevertheless, military objectives in the vicinity of children remain liable to 
attack subject to the respect of the proportionality rule.  There are four 
views on how the violations by the defender party influence the position of 
involuntary human shields in relation to the proportionality rule:154 
 
First position: involuntary human shields are not to be counted in the 
proportionality and precautions analysis, and thus do not affect the 
attackerʼs obligations.  However, this view finds scant support in 
literature; civilians do not lose their protected status as a result of 
the wrongful acts of a party to the conflict.155  
 
Second position: involuntary human shields remain immune from 
direct attack, but are “discounted" when calculating incidental injury 
in the analysis of proportionality and precautions. When the 
defender party uses civilians to shield a military objective, this fact 
                                                
152 ICRC study, P. 338. 
153 Commentary to article 147 GCIV, p.597. 
154 Schmitt, Michael. Human Shields In International Humanitarian Law. In Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
Volume 47 issue 2. (2009). (Pp. 292-338) at Pp. 327-335: Schmitt asserts that there are three possibilities with regards to the 
situation of involuntary human shields and the proportionality analysis, then suggests a fourth approach. 
155 Ibid., p. 327. 
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should be used for the benefit of the attacker and not the defender.  
It is argued that the rationale behind such a view aims at minimizing 
the risk of using civilians to evade attacks on lawful targets.  To 
clarify this approach, Schmitt draws the analogy of the workers in 
munitions factory, who are not entitled to the full benefits of civilian 
status while at work.156 
 
Despite its limitations, the proportionality rule clearly indicates that collateral 
damage to civilians should be weighed against the anticipated military 
advantage.  The rule does not further categorize civilian status (according 
to occupation or other criteria) nor does it exclude any category of civilians 
except those who directly participate in hostilities. 
 
In addition, such an analogy practically ignores the cardinal rules of 
distinction and proportionality: involuntary human shields remain civilians 
eligible for their protected status under IHL and they fall within the definition 
of ʻciviliansʼ also in relation to the proportionality rule.  Forthermore, the 
analogy fails to observe two important factors: knowledge and consent.  
Usually, munitions factory workers know about the risk they are facing by 
working in a military establishment and yet willingly decide to take up such 
occupation.157  
 
Although in many cases, civilian adults, used as involuntary human shields, 
would be aware of the surrounding situation, they would lack the consent 
element and frequently the ability to react in such situations.  However, this 
view cannot be applicable to inadvertent or unwitting children who lack both 
important factors.  This should be taken into consideration when it comes to 
                                                
156 Ibid., p. 331 
157 If the consent element is not present, further analysis of the situation would be necessary. 
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proportionality tests related to attacks on targets involving children as 
involuntary human shields.  
 
To illustrate the importance of the ʻawarenessʼ or ʻknowledgeʼ factor in 
addition to the ʻability to react to situations of dangerʼ, an analogy can be 
drawn to the case of mentally disabled persons. Their probable 
unawareness of the surrounding circumstances and their special 
vulnerability ought to be taken into account in the formulation of protective 
rules.  It should be highlighted that in this case, issues of distinction might 
be more complex unless their location is clearly identifiable; i.e. they are 
present in a clearly marked institution.  
 
Turning to the rationale behind such a view, it seems logical that it aims at 
minimizing the risk of using civilians to evade attacks on lawful targets.  
However it fails to consider a significant deterrent factor: the party using 
civilians as human shields is in breach of its legal obligations.158 In IAC, the 
shielding party would be committing war crimes.159  In assessing its 
immediate military advantage, a belligerent party will take into account that 
its shielding acts constitute a considerable disadvantage in the long term.  
Denying shielding activities is not easily tenable when placing children 
within or in the vicinity of military objectives. 
 
Finally, while this view focuses primarily on the interests of the belligerent 
parties, it ignores to a large extent a central purpose of IHL, namely the 
protection of civilians from the atrocities of warfare.  In other words, the 
focus in the discussed view is on the standpoints of the conflicting parties, 
rather than on the interest of the victims in the event of attack. 
                                                
158 Article 51(7), API; rule 97, ICRC study. 
159 Article  8(2)(b) (xxiii), Rome Statute. 
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Third position: Schmitt suggests an approach which reconciles 
different views: while counting involuntary human shields fully as 
civilians in the proportionality analysis, in cases of uncertainty about 
the conformance of an attack with proportionality rule (i.e. whether 
the attack is proportional or not) an attacker would be entitled to 
launch the strike.160  
 
However, such an approach renders the principle of proportionality even 
more ineffective and vulnerable to abuse than it is due to its ill-defined 
limits.161  In cases where the rule is violated, certain alleged facts could be 
“adjusted” according to the interests of the violating party.  In addition, this 
view strengthens the subjective element in the proportionality assessment, 
when there is an increasing need for more objective criteria. 
 
Fourth position: As civilians, involuntary human shields are entitled 
to the full benefits of their IHL protections against the effects of 
hostilities.  An opponent's unlawful conduct may not be grounds for 
the disregarding of civilians' legal protection rules.  
This view is inline with article 51.8 of API, which does not release a party 
facing human shields from its legal obligations relevant to targeting.  In 
addition, civilians are not deprived of their civilian status by the presence of 
military objectives within the civilian population.162 Thus, involuntary human 
shields factor fully into proportionality and precautions assessments. This 
                                                
160 Schmitt (2009), fn. 154, p.332. 
161 See section 3.4 ‘Critique to proportionality rule’. 
162 Article  50(3), API. 
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approach seems to find support to a certain extent in legal literature.163  
Human Rights Watch takes a similar position and extends it to cover 
voluntary human shields too.164  
 
Furthermore, this approach is arguably165 in conformity with the rule on 
non-application of the principle of reciprocity when it comes to rules 
concerned with the protection of the human person.166  This is consistent 
with art. 60(5) of the VCLT ruling out the suspension of a treaty for wrongful 
conduct of a party in the case of provisions concerned with the protection of 
the human person.167   
 
This assertion is also in line with the rule, which stipulates that the 
obligation to respect and ensure respect for IHL does not depend on 
reciprocity, as found in treaty and customary law.168  While the defender 
party is in breach of its legal obligations by using civilians as human 
shields, this cannot justify violations of the laws regarding distinction and 
proportionality rules by the attacking party. 
 
                                                
163 Bouchié de Belle, Stephanie.  Chained to cannons or wearing targets on their t-shirts: human shields in international 
humanitarian law.  In: International Review of the Red Cross Volume 90 Number 872. (December 2008). (Pp. 883-906) at 
p.901; and the ICRC "Interpretive Guidance" on Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law; 
which restricts the view on extreme cases, where the involuntary human shields are either forced or unaware of their 
shielding activity. P. 1027 
164 Human Rights Watch, Briefing Paper: International Humanitarian Law Issues in a Potential War in Iraq. 20 February 
2003. P.3.  Available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2003/02/20/international-humanitarian-law-issues-potential-war-iraq 
165 It is argued that the rule on non-application of the principle of reciprocity when it comes to IHL does not cover rules on 
the conduct of hostilities; i.e. a belligerent party can attack enemy civilians if the opponent is doing so against the other 
party’s nationals. 
166 E.g.: art. 51(8), API: ‘[a]ny violation of these prohibitions shall not release the Parties to the conflict from their legal 
obligations with respect to the civilian population and civilians.’ 
167 Bouchié de Belle (2008), supra fn. 163, p.899. 
168 Rule 140, ICRC study; See also common Articles 1 and 3, GCs on respecting and ensuring respect of conventions “in all 
circumstances”. 
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The rules on the protection of children used as involuntary human shields 
are interrelated with the proportionality analysis and do not treat children in 
situations of attack as a distinct group.  
 
2.4 Concluding remarks 
Article77 of API stipulates that children shall be the ʻobject of special 
respectʼ.  International law has so far acknowledged the special needs of 
some vulnerable groups and has granted special status for children as a 
distinct group under IHL. However, the ʻspecial protectionʼ regime does not 
cover situations of conduct of hostilities.  
 
Turning to general protections accorded to all civilians, the principle of 
distinction establishes the foundation of legal protection to civilians. 
Children are covered by the same rules applicable to other civilians.  
However, these rules are qualified; the legality of attacks on targets 
involving children is subject to the proportionality rule.  
 
While the proportionality related calculations are widely debated in relation 
to human shields, it would be essential to assess not only whether the lives 
of children should be included in the proportionality test, but also whether, 
and to what extent the proportionality rule, in its existing methods of 
application and interpretation, grants them concrete protection.169 
 
                                                
169 See section 3.4 “Critique of the proportionality rule”. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3. Application and assessment of rules of International Humanitarian 
Law 
3.1. Introduction 
In order to evaluate the existing rules on the protection of children under 
IHL, the present chapter will examine their applicability to the following 
cases as an illustration of instances where attacks mostly occur on children 
during armed conflicts. 
 
3.2 Cases for analysis 
The following cases shall be studied: 
 
A. Deliberate attacks on children: The children are neither within 
nor in the vicinity of a military objective. They are attacked as such, 
i.e. intentionally causing injury or loss of childrenʼs lives.   
B. Combatants mingle or hide military objectives (e.g. munitions) 
next to, or within civilian objects; e.g. schools or any other areas, 
among or near children.  The attack is on a civilian object containing 
military objectives; i.e. knowingly causing injury or loss of childrenʼs 
lives. Two possible situations arise in this case: 
(i) The knowing injury or loss of childrenʼs lives is intentional, where 
the attacker intends to indiscriminately destroy the whole target, 
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including the civilian children. 
(ii) The knowing injury or loss of childrenʼs lives is unintentional, 
where the attacker intends to destroy specifically the military 
objectives inside the civilian object and the civilian loss of life -as a 
result of the attack- although foreseeable is unintended.  
C. Children are within or in the vicinity of a military objective.  
The attack is targeted at a military objective and the childrenʼs death 
is a result of collateral damage; i.e. incidentally caused loss of 
civilian lives. 
 
3.3 Application of International Humanitarian Law rules to situations 
of attack 
In situation A, where the children are neither within nor in the vicinity of a 
military objective, the prohibition of deliberate attacks and the distinction 
principle provide clear protection against the targeting of children as part of 
the civilian population.170  Such deliberate attacks constitute war crimes in 
IAC171 and NIAC172 and a grave breach of API in IAC.173 
 
Turning to situations B and C, one question that arises is that of reprisals. 
“Reprisals are measures contrary to law, but which, when taken by one 
State with regard to another State to ensure the cessation of certain acts or 
to obtain compensation for them, are considered as lawful in the particular 
conditions under which they are carried out”.174 
                                                
170 Article  51(2) and article 13(2), APII. 
171 Article 8(2)(b)(i), Rome Statute. 
172 Ibid., 8(2)(e)(i). 
173 Article  85(3)(a), API. 
174 Commentary to article 33 GCIV, p.227. 
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Would attacking an objective knowingly causing the loss of civilian lives 
constitute a reprisal in response to the illegality of actions by the party using 
these children as human shields175 or by placing them in the vicinity of a 
military objective?176   
 
Historically, traditional customary law allowed for reprisals against the 
civilian population,177 the 1949 GCIV prohibited them against civilians in 
occupied territories.178 Subsequently, the 1977 API completely banned 
attacks against the civilian population or civilians by way of reprisals.179  
This prohibition was largely debated180 and is still not acceptable by some 
States.181  
 
However, the intent behind such attacks needs to be proven in each case in 
order to establish that the reprisal aims at attacking civilians.  Without 
evidence of the intention to attack civilians, it is uncertain whether such 
attacks are ʻmeasures contrary to lawʼ in the first place to fall under the 
reprisal definition.  In case such attacks cause disproportionate loss to the 
anticipated military advantage, they would be unlawful and hence come 
within the scope of ʻmeasures contrary to lawʼ under the definition of 
reprisals. 
In addition, it might be argued that the violations committed by the defender 
party towards its own children (by using them for shielding purposes) do not 
constitute a basis for triggering the belligerent reprisals mechanism.  
Nevertheless, the use by a party to the conflict of its own children to shield 
                                                
175 Article  51(7), API. 
176 Ibid., article  58(a). 
177 Kalshoven, F.  Belligerent Reprisals. Second edition. (Leiden 2005). Pp.353-361. 
178 Article  33, GCIV. 
179 Article 51(6), API. 
180 Oerter (1998), fn.17 at p. 235. 
181 E.g. the US, see US Naval Manual (1997), para. 6.2.3. 
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military objectives is indeed a breach of IHL rules and belligerent reprisals 
against civilians are prohibited under IHL rules.182 
 
Focusing on situation B, where combatants mingle or hide military 
objectives (e.g. munitions) in civilian objects; i.e. schools or any other areas 
among children, the following IHL rules are to be considered in cases (i) 
and (ii): 
(i) In cases of foreseeable and intended loss of civilian life, where the 
attack is launched on the target as a whole, without care being taken to 
spare the civilian population.   
Firstly, it is difficult to distinguish between the latter case and cases where 
the attacker does intend to attack civilians. The attackerʼs intention may be 
inferred from the means and methods employed in the attack and whether 
he sought to destroy mainly the military objective, or not.183 
Secondly, one legal view asserts that the term “incidental” bears a notion of 
unpredictability; i.e. damage must never be intended, even if proportionate 
to the importance of the military target.184  To read the rule on precautions 
in attacks as “an authorization to the warring parties to intentionally 
produce proportionate damage to the civilian population and their property” 
[emphasis added] would constitute a twisting of provision 57, API.185   This 
view is in line with article 57 (5), API which states, that ʻno provision of this 
article may be construed as authorizing any attacks against the civilian 
                                                
182 Article 51(6), API. 
183 Further examination of the elements of the crime regarding the mental element  would be necessary in making such an 
appraisal. 
184 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion (1996). ICJ Rep 226, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Higgins. P.366. Para 22. 
185 Benvenuti, Pablo. The ICTY Prosecutor and the Review of the NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia. In: European Journal of International Law. Vol 12, no.3, (2001). (Pp 503-529). P.509.  
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population, civilians or civilian objects.ʼ  Benvenuti argues that even an 
intentional proportionate damage would not be permissible if it could have 
been avoided.186  This view corresponds to the obligation on belligerent 
parties to choose the military objective which may be expected to cause 
least danger to civilian lives and objects.187  Nevertheless, the latter rule is 
restricted to cases where several military objectives for obtaining a similar 
military advantage are available and whether the attacking party has the 
possibility of choice between the different targets.188 
Thirdly, the presence of non-civilian individuals within the civilian population 
does not deny the civilian character of the population.189 An attack would be 
indiscriminate if it is not directed against a specific military objective, 
employing means and methods which cannot be directed at a specific 
military objective or whose effects cannot be limited as required by IHL.190 
Such attacks are prohibited under IHL.191  As Doswald-Beck put it,192 the 
ICJ equated the indiscriminate attack to a direct attack on civilians in the 
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion.193  
Fourthly, since targeting can be conducted only at military objectives, then 
all other objects are immune from attack.194  In situations where there is 
uncertainty regarding the nature of an object, there is a mandatory 
                                                
186 Ibid. 
187 Article  57(3), API. 
188 Ibid., article  57(3). 
189 Ibid., article  50 (3). 
190  Ibid., article 51(4). 
191 Ibid., article  51(4). 
192 Doswald-Beck, Louise. International Humanitarian Law and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice 
on the Legality or the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. In: International Review of the Red Cross No. 316, 35 (1997). (Pp. 
35-55) at p. 38. 
193 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, fn. 95, p. 259 para. 78. 
194 Schmitt (2004), fn. 148, p.97.  
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presumption in favor of immunity.195  If there is a clear indication that a 
civilian object is being used for military purposes, it forfeits such 
immunity.196  
 
Fifthly, willful killing and willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to 
body or health to protected persons under GCIV is a grave breach of the 
Convention.197 However, the Commentaries to the Geneva Conventions 
stipulate that “cases in which protected persons are killed as a result of acts 
of war -- for example, the bombardment of a civilian hospital -- are more 
difficult to class as willful killing: the question is left open.”198 
 
Nevertheless, an attack on a military objective in a civilian object (for 
example a school or hospital) causing an intentional loss of civilian life and 
employing indiscriminate means and methods would be indiscriminate, thus 
prohibited under IHL.  
(ii) In cases of foreseeable and unintended loss of civilian life as a 
result of attack (situation B(ii)), the attacker seeks to destroy the military 
objective and the civilian loss of life occurs as an unintended result of 
the attack. 
Such an attack would be lawful if it is directed against the military objective 
with means which are not disproportionate in relation to the objective, but 
are suited to destroying only that objective. The effects of the attacks must 
be limited according to IHL rules; even after those conditions are fulfilled, 
                                                
195 Article  52 (3), API. 
196 Ibid., article  52 (2). 
197 Article 147. 
198 Commentary to article  147 GCIV, p.597. 
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the attack should not breach the proportionality rule.199 In other words, 
children in this case are used as involuntary human shields and the military 
objectives remain liable to attack subject to the limitations of the 
proportionality rule.200 
The same applies to situation C, where children are within or in the vicinity 
of a military objective.  For instance, launching an attack on a truck carrying 
weapons and children; the truck constitutes a military objective,201 the 
presence of children on the same truck does not render the latter an illegal 
target.202  The truck is still liable to attack, subject to the rule on 
proportionality, i.e. as long as the incidental death of civilians is 
proportionate to the anticipated military advantage.   
 
In both situations B(ii) and C, where the attacker does not intend to launch 
an attack on the children, the word ʻincidentalʼ in the proportionality analysis 
is more adequate to the context. The proportionality assessment is 
necessary and precautionary measures are to be considered. The rule 
relating to the cancellation or suspension of attacks, because they are 
expected to be disproportionate,203 is an attempt to safeguard civilian lives, 
even when the defender party does not respect the required measures of 
protection with regard to them.204  In other words, the lack of intention to 
target civilians does not absolve the attacker party from the obligation to 
                                                
199 See Commentary to article  51(5)(b), API. Para 1979. 
200 See further analysis of the proportionality rule in section 3.4. 
201  Article  52(2), API. 
210 De Mulinen, Frédéric. Manuel sur le droit de la guerre pour les forces armées. Published by the International Committee 
of the Red Cross. (Geneva 1989).. P. 14. para. 56. 
203 Article 57(2)(b), API. 
204 Commentary on API, para 1991. 
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take all feasible precautions with a view to ʻavoidingʼ or in any event 
ʻminimizingʼ the loss of civilian lives or injury to civilians.205   
 
Deliberate attacks on children (situation A) are in breach of the principle of 
distinction.   Knowingly and intentionally destroying a target, containing 
children, as a whole (situation B(i)), constitutes an indiscriminate attack. 
Belligerent reprisals remain controversial and hard to prove in each case.  
In situations B(ii) and C, where the death of children is unintentional, the 
legality of the attack must be assessed in light of the proportionality rule 
applicable to all civilians. A critical appraisal of the proportionality rule will 
be discussed in the next section. 
It is worth underlining that throughout the application of IHL rules to the 
above cases, no provisions provide children in situations of attack with 
particular or special protection.  
 
3.4 Critique of the proportionality rule 
As discussed above, in cases where the attack is launched against a 
specific military objective and where it is expected that incidental damage to 
civilians or civilian objects will be caused, a proportionality analysis must be 
undertaken before launching an attack.  Thus, “the proportionality rule 
affects the decision whether to attack a military objective not whether an 
object is a military objective.”206 
 
In reference to the truck scenario or situation B (ii) (knowingly but 
unintentionally causing loss of civilian lives), an important question is 
                                                
205 Article  57(2)(a)(iii). 
206 Henderson (2009), fn. 126, p.198.  
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raised:  to what extent is the loss of life considered in fact incidental, if there 
is a clear indication of the presence of children in the truck?  This question 
can only be answered adequately after examining the factual 
circumstances after the incident has taken place and assessing the 
damage incurred thereof in order to confirm the intention of the attacker. 
 
Moreover, in relation to both situations B(ii) and C (incidentally caused loss 
of civilian lives, where the attackerʼs intention is primarily to destroy the 
military objective), further questions are raised: 
How many children may be killed for the attacker not to be found in violation 
of the proportionality rule? How is the weight of the anticipated military 
advantage assessed in relation to the civilian loss? What and how are the 
relative values assigned to ʻmilitary advantageʼ and ʻcivilian damageʼ? What 
is included in the total sum? What is excessive? To what extent do 
knowledge and intention factor in the equation?  In order to verify the 
legality of launching an attack, an adequate appraisal of proportionality in 
each case must be undertaken by answering the above questions. 
 
The ICTY prosecution underlined the great difficulty in evaluating 
proportionality when weighing human lives in the proportionality balance.207  
Judges McDonald and Vohrah considered it as “another way of referring to 
the utilitarian approach of weighing the balance of harms [...] when it comes 
to human lives having to be weighed and when the law must determine […] 
that one life or a set of lives is more valuable than another.”208  
 
                                                
207 Erdemović (Appeal), (case no IT-96-22-A), ICTY AC, 7 October 1997, Appeals Transcript, 26 May 1997. Pp. 84-85. 
Available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/trans/en/970526IT.htm. 
208 Erdemović (Appeal), (case no IT-96-22-A), ICTY AC, 7 October 1997, Joint and Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald 
and Judge Vohrah 1997, para 81. 
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On the other hand, there are so far no set criteria related to the ʻanticipated 
military advantageʼ in the test in question.  Were the military advantage 
criteria well defined under IHL, attacking a military target involving children 
would be permissible in IHL only under clear and well-set conditions.  In 
cases of uncertainty regarding the fulfillment of such ʻpresumedʼ conditions, 
and in order to counterbalance the anticipated military advantage from an 
attack, the attacking party would have to consider other military options to 
reach its objective. 
 
In practice, a party to the conflict often resorts to blaming its opponent for 
using shielding activities as means of justifying its attacks on targets 
including civilians.209 At that point, unless the damage is clearly 
disproportionate, given the absence of strict legal criteria for an ʻacceptableʼ 
anticipated military advantage in the context of the proportionality rule, an 
attacking party has a substantial margin for a subjective evaluation of its 
own expected military advantage.  The flexibility of the proportionality rule 
can constitute a tool for abuse and a means of proving the legality of 
ʻsubjectively assessedʼ attacks.  After all, the presence of children within a 
military objective does not render the latter immune from attack; the 
attacking party may claim that the anticipated military advantage is so vital 
that the damage to civilians is not excessive in a given situation. 
 
Another issue to be raised here is related to investigating cases of 
violations of the proportionality rule.  Such investigations would normally 
take place after the end of the investigated event and preliminarily by the 
violating state.210  Here issues of objectivity in weighing up the 
                                                
209  E.g. Gaza incident, supra fn.10.  
210 According to the principle of subsidiarity in international criminal law, the forum State has priority in investigating 
alleged crimes by the exercise of territorial jurisdiction.  Under certain conditions (lack of will or ability by the forum State 
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proportionality balance are in question. Besides the possibilities where 
belligerent parties can try to ʻjustifyʼ their ”anticipated military advantage”, to 
what extent can one guarantee that the relevant facts would not be ʻre-
adjustedʼ to fit within the legal frame of the ill-defined rule? 
 
Furthermore, to what extent does authorizing the launch of attacks on 
targets involving children by applying the proportionality rule, even under 
stringent conditions, lead to the collapse of the distinction principle, given 
the space offered to conflicting parties to maneuver and abuse the 
proportionality rule.  
 
Dill summarizes the flaws of proportionality in IHL; firstly, the rule fails to set 
a standard for results of combat operations by prescribing how an actor 
should intend to employ means with regard to ends; thus focusing on the 
ʻintendedʼ rather than the ʻactualʼ collateral damage.  Secondly, it does not 
specify a mechanism of how two dissimilar values, human life and military 
advantage, should be weighed against each other.  Subsequently, the 
existing rule fails to guide the military, since it relies on an essentially 
subjective and personal assessment due to the lack of a transparent and 
stable set of criteria to determine what is considered proportionate. 
Consequently, the rule fails to arbitrate due to the same interpretive 
uncertainties reflected in intense international controversy.  As a result of 
the indeterminacies of the law, the application of the proportionality rule in 
                                                                                                                                  
to genuinely investigate the case), other parties or international tribunals may take over. This does not preclude other forms 
of jurisdiction, such as the protective principle, the universality principle, active and passive personality principle. See 
Ryngaert, Cedric.  Jurisdiction in International Law. Oxford 2008. (Pp.85-133). 
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practice becomes complicated, which renders its effectiveness in protecting 
civilians questionable.211   
 
In many instances where there has been substantial loss of civilian lives, it 
is uncertain whether it was due to the inadequacy of the existing 
proportionality rule or the failure of belligerent parties to adhere to it.212  The 
failure to abide by the rule could either result from a partyʼs unwillingness to 
do so or its inadequate subjective assessment as to what is permissible 
under the proportionality rule.  
 
Finally, one cannot find a clear-cut answer to the above question based on 
an objective and well-defined set of criteria.  Therefore, several IHL experts 
maintain that the details of this principle need to be more concretely 
clarified than they have been to date.213  
 
Since many aspects of the proportionality rule remain vague,214 and many 
questions are unanswered,215 children are practically left at the discretion of 
the attacker at the time of attack.  In addition, the proportionality rule does 
not include any particular considerations when the civilians involved in the 
assessment are children, nor does it assign a special or particular weight to 
the loss of childrenʼs lives.   
 
                                                
211 Dill, Janina.  Applying the Principle of Proportionality in Combat Operations. Policy Briefing. Oxford Institute For 
Ethics, Law, And Armed Conflict. Oxford December (2010). P.2-5. 
212 Ibid., p.4.  The author draws the example of "Operation Cast Lead" in winter 2008/2009 by arguing that it is 
controversial whether the Gaza humanitarian catastrophe was a result of a violation of the principle of proportionality or 
whether the law was in fact adhered to. 
213 E.g. Fenrick (1997), fn.136, pp.545-46. 
214 Dill (2010), fn 211, p.2. 
215 See also Sloane (2009), fn 137, p.111. 
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3.5 Concluding remarks 
Given the uncertainties regarding the proportionality rule and the lack of 
strict or well-defined criteria, it is not clear under current IHL rules, how 
unanswered questions regarding attacks on targets involving children can 
be resolved. 
An examination of other normative frameworks which also apply might 
serve in answering these questions. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
4. Protection of children under other legal paradigms 
 
4.1 Introduction 
As a general rule of treaty interpretation, article 31.3.c of the VCLT states 
that in interpreting a given treaty, "any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties shall be taken into account.”  
Hence, other relevant rules of International Human rights law (IHRL) and 
International Criminal Law (ICL) must be examined.  This chapter will 
examine how different legal paradigms apply and interrelate with regards to 
the protection of children during the conduct of hostilities.  Then, it shall 
explore the special measures of protection and the right to life as 
incorporated in general IHRL instruments. Subsequently, the right to life 
under the CRC shall be discussed.  The point is to examine whether 
children are given special protection in light of other rules during the 
conduct of hostilities. 
 
4.2 International Human Rights Law  
4.2.1 Applicability, interrelation and methodology 
Traditionally, the view was that human rights treaties apply only in 
peacetime and are restricted to the treatment by a State of its own 
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population.216  This view is still upheld by some States.217   Currently, the 
most dominant view stipulatesthat “fundamental human rights […] continue 
to apply fully in situations of armed conflict.”218 
 
Although distinct, both IHL and IHRL regimes have “the protection of the 
integrity of the human person” as one of their major goals,219 sharing a 
“common core of fundamental non-derogable rights”.220 Thus, IHL and IHRL 
influence and reinforce each other,221 which results in increasing the 
effective protection of civilians caught in situations of armed conflicts.222 
 
This interrelation is evidenced by the reference of international tribunals to 
IHRL norms in their proceedings related to situations of armed conflict.223  
Moreover, IHRL treaties do not exclude such application, although some 
                                                
216 Provost, René. International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law. Series: Cambridge Studies in International and 
Comparative Law No. 22. (Cambridge 2002). Pp.2-7. 
217 Walsh, Patrick. Fighting for Human Rights: The Application of Human Rights Treaties To United States' Military 
Operations. In: 28 Penn State International Law Review 45. (Summer 2009). (Pp. 45-81) at p. 48: “[T]he United States 
disagrees with the proposition that international human rights treaties apply extraterritorially and during armed conflicts.”.  
According to same source at p. 63, Israel maintains the same position.  
218 UN General Assembly, Res. 2675 (XXV), 9 December 1970 (adopted by 109 votes in favour, none against and 8 
abstentions), para 1. 
219 Provost (2002), fn. 216, p.2; and Robertson, Arthur Henri.  “Humanitarian Law and Human Rights.”  In: (Christophe 
Swinarski eds.). Studies and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles in Honour of Jean Pictet. 
(Geneva/The Hague: ICRC/Nijhoff, 1984).  (Pp. 793-802). P 793. 
220 Prosecutor v. Delalic, (Case No. IT-96-21-A), ICTY AC, Appeals Judgment on 20 February 2001, para. 149; Juan 
Carlos Abella (Argentina) (Case 11.137), IACHR Report No. 55-97, 18 November 1997, para. 158.  
221 Meron (2006), supra fn. 126, p.4. 
222 See Draper, G. I. A. D. The Relationship Between the Human Rights Regime and the Law of Armed Conflict. In: 
Proceedings of the International Conference on Humanitarian Law – San Remo, 24–27 Sept. 1970. Grassi: Istituto Editoriale 
Ticinese. (1970). (Pp.141-145); UN Doc. A/8052 (1970): Report of the Secretary-General on Respect for Human Rights in 
Armed Conflict. P.13 para. 28. 
223 E.g.: Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, (Case No. IT-95-17/1-T), ICTY Trial Chamber, Trial Judgement of 10 December 
1998, Para170: The court referred to the lack of provisions related to the prohibition on rape in IHRL instruments, it referred 
to provisions safeguarding physical integrity as implicitly prohibiting rape; and Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac et al. (Case 
Nos. IT-96 -23-T and IT-96-23/1-T) (ICTY Trial Chamber), Judgement of 22 February 2001, paras. 466-467: The court 
referred to IHRL instruments to define the crime of torture.. 
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rights are derogable in situations of public emergency224 and subject to 
certain conditions.225 
The ICJ also confirmed that IHRL is applicable in armed conflicts.226  
Furthermore, the ICRC Study concluded that “[t]here is extensive State 
practice to the effect that human rights law must be applied during armed 
conflicts.”227 
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has also issued several 
resolutions affirming the need for full respect for human rights in areas of 
armed conflicts.228 
 
Turning to the interrelation between the two paradigms, the problems 
arising from their simultaneous application during armed conflict must be 
solved by reference to the principle ʻlex specialis derogat legi generaliʼ,229 
which means that the rule closer and more specific to a particular subject 
matter prevails over the more general rule and hence applies to that certain 
context.230  Sassoli and Olson maintain that there are different views 
regarding the criteria for choosing the lex specialis rule applicable to a 
given situation:231 
                                                
224 e.g. Article  4(1), ICCPR; article  15(1), ECHR. 
225 e.g. article  4(3), ICCPR; article  15(1) and (3), ECHR. 
226 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, fn. 95, paras 24, 25;  and Wall Advisory Opinion, supra fn. 43,p.178, para 106. 
227 ICRC Study. P. 303. 
228 E.g.: Preamble, UNSC Res. 237(1967); UNSC Res.1589(2005), P.10; preamble, UNSC Res.1723(2006).  
229 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, fn. 95, para. 106; Congo case, fn. 43, paras. 216–220. 
230 Koskenniemi, Martti.  Fragmentation of international law : difficulties  arising from the diversification and expansion 
of international law.  
Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission. UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682. (13 April 2006). Para 60. 
231 Sassoli, Marco and Olson, Laura M. The relationship between international humanitarian and human rights law where it 
matters: admissible killing and internment of fighters in non-international armed conflicts. In: International Review of the 
Red Cross  90 (871) (September 2008). (Pp. 599 – 627)  pp.603-604. 
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a) Applying the most just rule; this approach involves a too 
subjective view, which is dangerous since it leads to irreversible 
results. 
b) Considering the teleological criterion. This approach also 
allows for personal preferences.232 
c) Applying the rule which has the larger ʻcommon contact 
surface areaʼ with the specific situation in question.233 
 
After determining the lex specialis, the lex generalis still remains present in 
the background and is taken into account when interpreting the lex 
specialis.234  
The lex generalis would contain other rules of international law to be taken 
into account according to article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT.  In cases of conflict 
of interpretation between two norms, there should be a constant attempt to 
harmonize them.235   
 
This approach is useful in clarifying matters, which are not clearly regulated 
under lex specialis rules, as it is the case in the present study with regards 
to the protection of children against attacks. In case it is assumed that IHL 
operates as lex specialis when dealing with an attack causing the death of 
children, IHRL must then step in to fill the gap.236  The best solution would 
be not to apply solely either one of the two branches of law, but rather to 
opt for a complementary approach.  This is not to be understood in a 
ʻconflationʼ sense, since the two regimes are distinct from the outset.   
                                                
232 Jenks, Wilfred. The conflict of law-making treaties. In: British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 30 (1953). (Pp. 401-
453) at p. 450. 
233 Term was used by Walker, Mary Ellen in Marco Sassoli’s IHL course, see Sassoli and Olson (2008), fn. 231, p. 604 (at 
footnote 13). 
234 Ibid., p.605 
235 Koskenniemi (2006), supra fn. 230, paras. 31, 37 
236 See Sassoli and Olson (2008), supra fn. 231,  p. 621. 
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Consequently, applying IHL rules concerning the protection of children does 
not preclude the corresponding parallel application of IHRL.237 Thus, if the 
application of the latter is required to provide further details about IHL 
regulation regarding an attack on a target involving children, consistent with 
the maxim of lex specialis, reference to IHRL may help in clarifying the 
relevant legal obligations.  
 
While admitting the complexity of questions of formal requirements relating 
to legal and practical difficulties when defining the human rights obligations 
of a given State acting outside its territories (especially criteria of ʻcontrolʼ 
for the establishment of ʻextraterritorial jurisdictionʼ),238 there exists an 
increasing trend against the limited reach of human rights instruments. It 
seems to be unclear on what basis States should not respect their legal 
obligations in their sovereign actions abroad including their military 
operations, by virtue of their control over their military decisions. 
 
Nevertheless, it cannot be asserted that there is a consensus on the 
necessary conditions to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction, to hold a State 
responsible for human rights violations while acting abroad. During IAC, the 
conduct of hostilities concerns persons over whom the attacker most 
commonly does not exercise ʻcontrolʼ in the strict sense of IHRL sense.  
 
                                                
237 See UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13: Human Rights Committee, General Comment  No. 31 (2004) on the nature of 
the general legal obligation imposed on states parties to the ICCPR (Art. 2) , para. 11 (26 May 2004)..  
238 On the requisite conditions for control to establish extraterritorial application of human rights, compare the ECtHR 
ruling in Issa et al. v Turkey, Judgment (16 November 2004) Paras.69-74, where the test is of “effective overall control” 
either exercised directly or through armed forces, a State might exercise temporarily effective overall control of the territory 
where it conducts military operations; and Franklin Guillermo Aisalla Molina (Ecuador v. Colombia) (hereinafter Ecuador 
Colombia Case), Report No. 112/10, Inter-State Petition IP-02, Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter 
IACtHR), Admissibility, 21 October 2010, para 99, requesting a causal nexus between the extraterritorial conduct and the 
alleged violation. 
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While the extraterritorial application of IHRL instruments remains 
controversial, the aim of exploring IHRL norms in this study is an attempt to 
discern the lack of clarity in the existing IHL rules with regards to attacks on 
targets involving children.  
 
4.2.2 Special protection for children in general international Human 
Rights Law instruments  
General IHRL protections concern ʻeveryoneʼ within the territory or under 
the jurisdiction of States parties, including children.   General protections 
are provided for in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR),239 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR)240 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR).241  Certain provisions are concerned specifically with children 
rights and entitle them to special treatment. 
  
Although not binding as a legal instrument such as treaties, the UDHR was 
adopted without any objections.242 It reflects Statesʼ main concerns 
regarding human rights.  The Declaration entitles children to special care 
without any discrimination.243 
 
                                                
239 Articles 14, 18, 23, 24, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter ICCPR); adopted by General 
Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entered into force on 23 March 1976. 
240 Articles 10, article  12(2)(a) and article 13(3), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(hereinafter ICESR), adopted by General Assembly, resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966; entered into force on  3 
January 1976. 
241 Article 25(2), Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter UDHR) 10 December 1948: “Motherhood and 
childhood are entitled to special care and assistance”. 
242 UDHR was adopted by 48 votes to none with 8 abstentions. 
243 Article 25(2). 
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The ICCPR also takes into consideration childrenʼs interests, namely in 
cases of marriage dissolution,244 proceedings concerning matrimonial 
disputes or guardianship issues245 and protecting their education rights.246  
Childʼs rights to such measures of protection are acquired by his status as a 
minor without any kind of discrimination.247   
 
Turning to the ICESCR, art 10(3) provides for special measures of 
protection and assistance to all children without any discrimination.  They 
should be protected from economic and social exploitation, and work 
harmful to their morals, health, or dangerous to life, or likely to hamper their 
normal development.  State parties should set age limits below which the 
paid employment of child labour should be prohibited and punishable by 
law. States parties are bound by minimum guarantees with regards to 
childrenʼs education248 and health.249 
 
In addition, it is often maintained that human rights violations of children are 
particularly serious,250 a view asserted by the Inter-American Court. It 
stresses the “gravity of violating human rights of a person who by his/her 
condition is placed in a position of vulnerability vis-à-vis adults […]”.251  The 
principle was reasserted in other cases.252 In determining the aggravated 
                                                
244 Article 23 (4). 
245 Article 14(1). 
246 Article 18. 
247 Article 24. 
248 Article 13. 
249 Article 12(2)(a). 
250 Feria Tina, Monica.  The Landmark rulings of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. (Leiden 2008).  Pp. 32-33. 
251 Villagràn Morales et al. v. Guatemala; judgement of 19 November 1999(Merits). Para.146. 
252 E.g. Yean and Bosico children v. Dominican Republic (Series C No. 130) IACtHR, Judgment of 8 September 2005, para 
134: “cases in which the victims of human rights violations are children are particularly serious”. Available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/130-ing.html .  
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responsibility of the State, the Court took into account the fact that the 
victims against whom the violations were directed were children.253 
 
The above paragraphs illustrate the recognition of the special needs and 
vulnerability of children. Consequently, IHRL treats children as a distinct 
group entitled to special measures of protection.  
4.2.2.1 Right to life as a general protection under IHRL 
The fundamental right to life constitutes an essential condition for the 
enjoyment of the range of protections under international law.  The Human 
Rights Committee held that it is “basic to all human rights.”254  It is 
enshrined in several IHRL instruments.255   
 
While there seems to be a consensus on its customary nature,256 some 
commentators argue that the right to life has acquired the status of a 
peremptory norm of general international law.257  Although this right is non 
derogable under several human rights instruments,258 the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom 
                                                
253 Feria (2008), supra fn. 250, pp.32-33. 
254 Human Rights Committee General Comment 14, p.17,para1. 
255 Article 3, UDHR; article 6, ICCPR; article 6, CRC.  
256 E.g., Hannikainen, Lauri. Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens ) in International Law. (Helsinki 1988), p.436;  Kuper (1997), 
fn.1, p.117; and Meron (1989), supra fn. 87, pp.193-4. 
257 Dinstein, Yoram. “The Right to life, Physical Integrity, and Liberty.”  In: (Louis Henkin eds.) The International Bill of 
Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. (New York 1981). (Pp 114-137). P. 114; and Nowak, M.  U.N. Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary, (N.P. Engel) Second edition. (Kehl 2005).  P.105. 
258 Article 6(1) read with article 4(2), ICCPR; see also: article 4(1) read with article 27(2), American Convention on Human 
Rights 1969 (Pact of San José, Costa Rica) prohibits suspension even in time of war of  article 19 (on rights of the child) and 
article 4 on right to life. 
 62 
(hereinafter ECHR) allows for derogation in cases of deaths resulting from 
lawful acts of war.259   
 
On the other hand, under the ICCPR, the formulation of this right is 
intertwined with the phrase “not to be arbitrarily deprived of life”.260  Most 
human rights instruments do not specify when a killing is deemed 
arbitrary.261  This vagueness is intentional in order to allow for a wide 
interpretation and subsequently a wide latitude for the protection against 
deprivation of this right.262  The term ʻarbitraryʼ is at times interpreted as not 
only ʻillegallyʼ but also ʻunjustlyʼ.263  
The ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion asserts that the test of 
what is an arbitrary deprivation of life is to be determined by the applicable 
lex specialis –IHL- designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities.264  
 
Accordingly, the deprivation of life is not always unlawful; e.g. when it 
respects IHL rules.  Thus, when assessing an attack on a target causing 
the death of children, the interpretation of whether such deprivation of life is 
ʻarbitraryʼ or not is subject to IHL rules operating as lex specialis.    
 
However, another view stipulates that the Nuclear Weapons ruling should 
not be interpreted narrowly, maintaining that this ruling does not mean that 
the right to life must be exclusively interpreted in light of that lex 
                                                
259 Article 2, read with article 15(2), European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom, 
4 November 1950. (ECHR) entered into force on 3 September 1953. 
260 E.g. article 6 (1), ICCPR.  
261 Sassoli and Olson (2008), fn. 231, p. 610 
262 Weissbrodt, D. “Protecting the Right to Life: International Measures Against Arbitrary or Summary Killings by 
Governments.”  In: (B.G. Ramcharan eds.) The Right To Life In International Law. (Drodrecht 1985).  (Pp. 297-314). Pp. 
297- 298. 
263 UN DOC. A/2929, ChapterVI: Civil and Political Rights, para3.  Available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NG9/000/20/PDF/NG900020.pdf?OpenElement. 
264 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, fn. 95, p.240. para 25 
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specialis.265  The said dictum should not be misunderstood. 266  It has to be 
read in the context of the opinion in which the “ICJ had to determine the 
legality in abstracto of the use of a certain weapon”,267 namely the nuclear 
weapon.     
Concerning the relationship between IHRL and IHL in situations of armed 
conflict, the ICJ enumerated three possible solutions:  
“some rights may be exclusively matters of international 
humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human 
rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of 
international law.”268 
 
The Courtʼs reasoning reflects the reinterpretation of IHL with an emphasis 
on promoting humanitarian considerations.269 This also conforms to the 
trend towards the growing relevance of human rights in time of armed 
conflict and the complementarity between IHL and IHRL.270  Nevertheless, 
the ICJ reiterated the Nuclear Weapons test in the Wall Advisory 
Opinion,271 while the question raised before the court did not concern 
nuclear weapons. 
 If childrenʼs right to life under general IHRL – operating as lex generalis- 
were absolute, this would have been reflected in IHL as lex specialis.   
However, qua lex lata, the deprivation of a childʼs life, as a result of a lawful 
act of war, is not arbitrary, thus not unlawful. 
                                                
265 See Gowlland-Debbas, Vera. The Relevance of Paragraph 25 of the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion On Nuclear Weapons. 98 
American Society of International Law Proceedings 358; proceeding of the Ninety-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American 
Society of International Law Human Right and Humanitarian Law. (March 31-April 3, 2004). (Pp.358-363) at p.362. 
266 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra fn. 95, para. 25. 
267 Sassoli and Olson (2008), fn. 231, p. 613. 
268 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra fn. 95, para106. 
269 Dale, Stephens. Human Rights And Armed Conflict -The Advisory Opinion Of The International Court of Justice In The 
Nuclear Weapons Case. Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal; Volume 4. (2001) (Pp.1-33) at p.15. 
270 Gowlland-Debbas (2004), supra fn. 265, p. 363 
271 Wall Advisory Opinion, fn. 43,  para105. 
 64 
 
4.2.3 Special Protection for children in the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child 
The CRC and its first Optional Protocol are focal instruments specifically 
concerned with children rights. The latter is primarily concerned with the 
issue of children recruited in armed forces or armed groups and includes 
specific provisions addressing their direct participation in hostilities272 and 
prohibiting their compulsory recruitment.273   It further condemns attacks on 
children in situations of armed conflict and direct attacks on places where 
children are generally significantly present, such as schools and 
hospitals.274 
 
The CRC, considers that children under international law are capable of 
"'enjoying the benefits of specific rights and freedoms."275  Childrenʼs rights 
are non derogable under the CRC. Furthermore, in the preparatory works, 
delegations recognized that children who live in “exceptionally difficult” 
situations need special consideration.276  
 
                                                
272 article 1, First Optional Protocol to CRC. 
273 Article 2. 
274 Preamble, First Optional Protocol to CRC.  
275 Van Bueren, Geraldine. The International Law on the Rights of the Child. (Dordrecht 1995). P. 12. 
276 UN DOC. E/CN.4/1988/28: Report of the working group on a draft convention on the rights of the child. Commission 
On Human Rights 6 April 1988. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G88/122/84/PDF/G8812284.pdf?OpenElement, para 10 and Preamble, CRC.  
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4.2.3.1 Right to life and the ʼbest interestsʼ of the child under the CRC  
Listed as a priority right before other rights in the CRC,277 article 6 is an 
unqualified provision stating that children have an ʻinherent right to lifeʼ.   
The wording of the provision does not provide for exceptions nor suggests 
the ʻarbitrarinessʼ requirement to the prohibition on deprivation of life. Yet, it 
is uncertain whether it can be inferred that any deprivation of such right 
would be automatically arbitrary in the case of children, although the 
prohibition against imposing capital punishment on children278 might be an 
indication in that direction. 
 
Moreover, article 3 of the CRC states that in all actions concerning children, 
State parties have an obligation to give primary consideration to the best 
interests of the child.279  Article 4 stipulates that its protected rights are to 
be safeguarded by all appropriate legislative, administrative, and other 
measures.  It follows that every institution within a State party to CRC is 
required to systematically assess the consequences of its actions or 
decisions on children, taking into consideration the best interest principle.280  
Moreover, the application of the CRC obligations should not be subject to 
discrimination of any kind.281  Among the discrimination criteria are the 
national and ethnic status, meaning that the rights of children from different 
origins should also be respected as long as they are within the jurisdiction 
of a certain State.282    
                                                
277 Ibid., para 21. 
278 Article 37(a), CRC; and article 6(5), ICCPR. 
279 Article 3, CRC. 
280 UN Doc. CRC/GC/2003/5: General Comment No. 5. Committee on the Rights of the Child.  Thirty-fourth session 19 
September-3 October 2003.P.4. 
281 Article 2(1), CRC. 
282 Ibid., article 2. 
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Although the extraterritorial application of human rights instruments is 
controversial, the ICJ confirmed the extraterritorial application of the CRC 
provisions in cases where a State exercises jurisdiction.283   Whereas this 
confirms the obligation to respect and ensure respect of the CRC during 
NIAC and in occupied territories, the situation is different during IAC, where 
the requisite elements for establishing the exercise of jurisdiction might be 
debated.284   
 
Prima facie, in cases where the exercise of jurisdiction is established, it 
seems to be intricate to tolerate permitting within the national legal system 
of a given State, attacks on targets causing childrenʼs loss of life during the 
conduct of hostilities by its armed forces, thus depriving them of their 
inherent right to life. 
 
However, article 38, CRC provides for the respect and ensuring the respect 
for the relevant IHL rules applicable to children in armed conflicts.  Hence, 
the deprivation of their inherent right to life during the conduct of hostilities 
may be justified by reliance on the interpretation of IHL rules, which remain 
unclear.285   
 
On the other hand, and in cases of attacks on targets involving children, if 
IHL as lex specialis is to be informed by lex generalis (IHRL), this will allow 
for providing particular care to children during the conduct of hostilities.   
The best interests of the child might infer a narrow application of the ill-
defined proportionality rule.  Higher threshold of application implies a 
                                                
283 Wall Advisoy Opinion, supra fn. 43, para 113. 
284 Compare the ICJ ruling of the Wall Advisory Opinion, supra fn. 43, (para 112) establishing that Israel exercised 
“effective control” on the Occupied Palestinian Territories, hence exercised jurisdiction; and Ecuador Colombia Case, fn. 
238, para99. 
285 See section 3.5. 
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stricter definition of military advantage, for instance requiring an imperative 
military necessity, or requiring that the anticipated military advantage to be 
achieved through a certain attack can clearly and absolutely not be delayed 
or reached through other means.     
It would be then less complex to classify the bombardment of a civilian 
object involving children, as to whether it constitutes willful killing or not 
within the meaning of article 147,GCIV after the examination of the relevant 
facts.  This would solve the ambiguity raised by the Commentary to article 
147, GCIV, where it stated that the bombardment of a civilian hospital is 
“more difficult to class as willful killing: the question is left open.”286  
The best interests provision might be read as suggesting a broader 
interpretation of the right to life under the CRC by excluding any lawfulness 
of its deprivation in the case of children even in situations of armed conflict.   
 
Furthermore, the prohibition against adverse distinction, the recognition of 
the special status of children in international law and their particular 
vulnerability in situations of armed conflicts, and the trend towards more 
respect of human rights in situations of armed conflict, suggest a broader 
reading of the Conventionʼs rules and scope of application to include acts of 
war committed by a State party on foreign territories, since such acts are 
committed by State agents acting under its authority.287 
 
Nonetheless, these premises do not represent the current legal position on 
the question.  So far, whether the right to life is absolute in the case of a 
child is so far not thoroughly debated; neither is the influence of a broader 
interpretation of the best interests of the child on IHL rues.  Hence, no 
consensus on the matter can be drawn; with the result that children can be 
                                                
286 Commentary to article 147 GCIV, p.597. 
287 See Ecuador Colombia Case, fn. 238, para 99. 
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lawfully deprived of their right to life under existing law subject to the 
relevant IHL rules. 
 
4.3 Protection of children under International Criminal Law 
Besides the rules related to all civilians including children, International 
Criminal Law includes provisions particularly concerned with children.  The 
Rome Statute preamble recognizes that during last century millions of 
children have been “victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the 
conscience of humanity.”288  It adopts one of the definitions of the crime of 
Genocide from the 1948 Convention on the  Prevention and Punishment  of 
the Crime of Genocide:289 the forcible transfer of children of a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group to another group if committed with the 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part the former group as such.290  It prohibits 
the trafficking of children as a crime against humanity when committed as 
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population, with knowledge of the attack.291  Among the definition of war 
crimes is the conscription or enlistment of children under 15 and engaging 
them in hostilities both in IACs292 and NIACs.293   
                                                
288 Preamble, Rome Statute. 
289 Convention on the  Prevention and Punishment  of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention). Adopted by the 
United General Assembly on 9 December 1948 as General Assembly Resolution 260. Entered into force on 12 January 1951. 
State  Parties: 140. State Signatories: 41. 
290 Article 6, RomeStatute ; article 2, Genocide Convention. 
291 Article 7(2)(b), Rome Statute. 
292 Article 8(2)(b) (xxvi), Rome Statute. 
293 Ibid., article 8(2)(e) (vii). 
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The Rome Statute is the first international instrument crystallizing the 
international individual criminal responsibility of those committing child-
specific crimes during armed conflicts.294  
 
The Treaty stipulates how children must be treated during criminal 
proceedings, e.g.:  when dealing with cases involving children, special 
considerations are made in the selection of judges295 and advisers,296 the 
prosecutor shall respect the interests and personal circumstances of victims 
and witnesses particularly in crimes involving violence against children.297  
An exception to the obligation to hold hearings in public can be made in 
such cases.298  The Court does not have jurisdiction over children under 18 
at the time of the alleged commission of a crime.299 
 
Article 21 of the Statute stipulates that the Courtʼs application and 
interpretation of the law must be consistent with the recognized human 
rights.  Hence, the CRC and other international instruments pertaining to 
childrenʼs rights are essential when dealing with cases involving children. 
 
Although children are treated as a distinct group in ICL, the Rome statute 
does not grant them ʻspecialʼ protection in situations of attack: they are 
treated as part of the civilian population and enjoy the same protection. 
 
                                                
294 Chamberlain, Cynthia. “Children and the International Criminal Court.” In: (Noelle Quénivet and Shilan Shah-Davis 
eds.) International Law and Armed Conflict, Challenges in the 21st Century. (The Hague 2010). (Pp. 245-261). P. 245. 
295 Ibid., article 8(b). 
296 Ibid., article 9. 
297 Ibid., article 54(1)(b). 
298 Ibid., article 68(1). 
299 Ibid., article 26. 
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4.4 Concluding remarks 
By virtue of specialized IHRL instruments concerned exclusively with 
children rights and other provisions incorporated within IHRL and ICL 
general instruments, children are entitled to and in fact are granted special 
treatment as a distinct group under international law.  However, such 
protections do not appear to provide for higher protection against the 
launching of attacks on targets involving children.  
 
Qua lex lata, as a general human right applicable to all persons under the 
jurisdiction of a State, the right to life during armed conflict is subject to the 
interpretation of IHL rules operating as lex specialis.  In other words, IHRL 
takes us back to the ill-defined rules of IHL concerning children in situations 
of attack.  On the other hand, the examination of the right to life under the 
CRC indicates that it remains unclear whether a childʼs right to life - owing 
to its formulation under the convention and the best interests principle- is 
better safeguarded in situations of armed conflict.  
 
It might be argued that, by virtue of the complementary approach, IHL as 
lex specialis can be informed by lex generalis and provide special 
protection to children in situations of attack.  This would be possible if lex 
generalis rules provided for higher level of protection to children in 
situations of attacks.  However, this is not the case for the relevant lex 
generalis rules. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5. Conclusion 
 
 
The particular vulnerability of children results in them being treated as a 
distinct group by different international law regimes.  In wartime, children 
are accorded a range of protection rules under IHL which aim to address 
their needs. 
However, these protection rules do not specifically cover situations of attack 
on targets involving children. If we return to the truck scenario, we find that 
the children are caught within the complex relationship between the 
belligerent parties.  They are abused by the defender party, who allows 
them to be in a situation which exposes them to the risk of death or 
permanent disability.  Their final destiny will depend on the decision of the 
attacker party - either to withhold, or to launch the attack; either to let the 
defender party gain an immediate military advantage, or to deny it the 
opportunity to do so.  
While there is a clear cut IHL regime defining the obligations of the 
defender party, and the resulting penal sanctions in cases of violations, the 
attackerʼs obligations, and the repercussions thereof, remain imprecise. 
Questions relating to the limits of the proportionality rule, military necessity 
and involuntary human shields remain unanswered.  This allows parties to 
the conflict a larger margin for subjective assessment.  The ambiguity in the 
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existing legal regime pertaining to the protection of children renders it prone 
to abuse. 
In the middle of these indeterminacies, the children on the truck and other 
children in similar situations should not be left to the mercies of the 
belligerent parties. Children cannot, and should not, have to pay the price 
for being put at risk by the defender party.   
 
Children in conflict areas are dying every day. These children are not just 
numbers. The current legal regime protecting children in situations of attack 
needs to be re-examined.  There is a need to frame child sensitive IHL 
rules and shift the focus from the rights and duties of the conflicting parties 
to the childrenʼs best interests.  The solution should be pragmatic; it must 
maintain the balance necessary for the viability of IHL with an awareness of 
the increasing potential to abuse children. Child sensitive protection rules 
need to be formulated, in order to reduce the threats facing them in such 
attack situations to the maximum extent possible.   
“In considering the future of children, we must be daring. We must look 
beyond what seems immediately possible and find new ways and new 
solutions.”300 
                                                
300 Machel Study, supra fn. 4, para 312. 
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